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INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of multiple attempts at class certification—when class 
counsel file the same putative class action in multiple successive courts and 
attempt to secure an order of certification despite previous denials of the 
same request—has always presented a vexing analytical puzzle. The 
continuing practical significance of the multiple-certification phenomenon is 
unclear. The enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 
the ascendancy of the Multi-District Litigation process (“MDL”), and the rise 
of non-class alternatives to the disposition of mass claims may together defuse 
the power of this strategy.  Even so, the puzzle is a fascinating one, raising 
basic questions about the analytical structure of the class action and the 
potentially intractable problems that arise in a federal system where states 
have the power to assert overlapping legislative and judicial jurisdiction on a 
national scale but lack consistent rules for resolving competing exercises of 
that jurisdiction. When the Supreme Court rejected one proposed solution to 
the problem in Smith v. Bayer,1 it left unresolved some of the broader questions 
of preclusion doctrine, federal common law, and the constraints of due 
process with which any satisfying approach will have to grapple. 
        ∗      Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  My thanks to Steve Burbank 
and Deborah Hensler for their colleagueship. 
 1. Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2374–75 (2011). 
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Professor Martin Redish and Megan Kiernan have proposed a novel 
solution in a recent Article, urging that courts apply an estoppel directly to 
class counsel as one potential response to multiple certification attempts.2  In 
this instance, unfortunately, novelty is not a virtue. Redish and Kiernan’s 
proposal is unsuccessful, exhibiting problems of theoretical inconsistency, 
doctrinal shallowness, and a lack of appreciation for the practical dynamics of 
aggregate litigation.  Sorting through the problems in their Article provides a 
useful occasion for mapping out the shape of the multiple certification issue 
and the analytical terrain that any workable solution will have to navigate. 
That terrain includes three key features that I will address in this Essay.  
First, the mechanism by which courts ordinarily prevent litigants from seeking 
multiple bites at the apple is the preclusive effect of a final and valid 
judgment.  When a court refuses a request for class certification, that refusal 
ordinarily means that absent class members are neither bound by the 
proceedings nor subject to the ordinary effects of preclusion doctrine. 
Second, any legislative or judicial response to the preclusion problem must 
be consistent with the requirements of due process as articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee,3 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust4 
and Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts.5  As I have argued before and reiterate below, 
the Due Process Clause can accommodate solutions to this problem. But 
explaining why this is so does require some clarification of recent statements 
by the Court, and it also calls for a rejection of the misconceived account of 
due process that Redish and Kiernan employ in their Article.  Third, any 
meaningful solution to the multiple certification problem must address 
practical questions of litigation dynamics: How do class actions actually 
operate, particularly those in which multiple certification attempts might be 
a genuine problem, and how would sophisticated lawyers react to different 
doctrinal responses?  The proposal to apply an estoppel directly to class 
counsel fails to account for the manner in which many complex cases operate 
and the options that would be available to plaintiff’s attorneys to circumvent 
such constraints if this proposal were actually put into effect. 
I. PRECLUSION DOCTRINE AND THE MECHANISMS FOR CONTROLLING SERIAL 
ADJUDICATION 
The operation of preclusion in class litigation is an exceptional 
application of the doctrine. Absent class members are not parties to a class 
action in the traditional sense: the court does not acquire jurisdiction over 
them in the same manner or for the same reasons that it does over defendants. 
Rather, the ability of a court to bind absentees to a class proceeding depends 
 2. Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation 
of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1660–64 
(2014). 
 3. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1940). 
 4. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950). 
 5. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). 
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on the court employing procedures designed to safeguard the interests of 
class members and the presence of a proper and adequate representative who 
promotes class members’ interests throughout the course of the proceeding.6  
The type and extent of preclusion that a judgment can impose on class 
members is defined and limited by these requirements.7 
The Supreme Court recently disapproved one attempt to use the federal 
common law of preclusion to bind absentees to a determination that a 
proposed action was not suitable for class treatment.  In Smith v. Bayer, the 
Court held that an absentee cannot be considered a “party” in such a 
proceeding until and unless the action is certified as a class, drawing on its 
earlier ruling in Devlin v. Scardaletti to define when non-named class members 
achieve “party” status.8 Bayer then pointed to Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court’s 
leading decision on non-party preclusion, and found that none of the 
discretely defined exceptions identified in that case were satisfied in the 
proceeding before it.  Because no “properly conducted class action” ever 
existed in the Bayer action, no “non-party preclusion” was possible.9  Despite 
the strong policy reasons for crafting a response to serial attempts at 
certification, the Court found that this syllogism—no formal party status and 
a failure to satisfy the defined categories of non-party preclusion, therefore 
no binding effect—must control.  In another recent decision, the Court relied 
on the lack of formal party status prior to class certification to reject an 
attempt by plaintiff’s counsel to bind a putative class to a stipulation 
concerning the jurisdictional amount in controversy.10 
As an initial matter, the textual emphasis that the Court places on the 
“certification” of a class when deciding when it is possible for a proceeding to 
affect the interests of absentees does not do as much work as the Court 
appears to assume. The formal step of class “certification” has a recent 
provenance in the text of the Rule. While that term did appear in many 
judicial opinions in the early years of modern class litigation, the 1966 version 
of Rule 23 itself said nothing about “certifying” a class or issuing a 
“certification” order.  Rule 23(c) required that a court “determine by order” 
whether “an action brought as a class action . . . is to be so maintained.”11  The 
rule made no reference to a specification of the precise definition of the class 
in that early-stage order, except to require in actions “maintained under 
 6. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894–95, 896–97 (2008) (describing the conditions 
necessarily for a properly maintained class action to bind absentees); Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. 
at 812 (emphasizing the need for adequate representation “at all times” during a class 
proceeding); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40–41 (holding that procedures designed to ensure adequate 
representation of the interests of absent parties are constitutionally required in class litigation). 
 7. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 
753 (2005). 
 8. Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379–80 (2011); Devlin v. Scardaletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 
(2002). 
 9. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2380–81. 
 10. See generally Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013). 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (1966 version). 
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subdivision (b)(3)” that “members . . . be identified through reasonable 
effort” for purposes of issuing notice.12  At the same time, the 1966 version of 
the Rule gave the district court power to make any such order “conditional,”13 
a qualification that many courts took as an invitation to proceed as a class even 
in the face of uncertainty that the proposed action could satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 23.14 
When seeking to determine who would be bound to the results of a class 
proceeding, some early decisions under the 1966 Rule placed less emphasis 
on the order permitting a case to proceed as a class and focused more on the 
content of the putative class complaint, the subsequent course of the 
proceedings, and the ultimate details of any resulting judgment.15 That fact, 
when combined with the invitation for courts to make the order “conditional” 
and the demand that the order concerning class treatment issue quickly—”as 
soon as practicable after the commencement of the action”16—sometimes led 
courts to employ insufficient rigor at the outset of the proceedings. 
This was the cluster of problems that led to the 2003 amendments to 
Rule 23, a set of substantial revisions to threshold practice in putative class 
actions.17  As the Advisory Committee explained, experience had 
demonstrated that the practice of conditional class actions and the pressure 
to issue an order quickly had the capacity to impose improper settlement 
pressure on defendants; thus, the authority to issue conditional orders was 
eliminated and the requirement for a prompt order was relaxed to “an early 
practicable time.”18  These changes were accompanied by the appearance of 
the terms “certify” and “certification” throughout the rule. The language of 
class “certification” had appeared once before when Rule 23(f) was added in 
 12. Id. at (c)(2). 
 13. Id. at (c)(1). 
 14. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 
1913–16 (2014) (describing experience of lower federal courts with conditional certification 
under the 1966 version of Rule 23). 
 15. In Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, for example—an opinion by noted procedure expert 
Judge William Schwarzer—the district court invoked the language of former Rule 23(c)(1)(C) 
and explained that an order conditionally permitting an action to proceed as a class was “nothing 
more than a tentative determination for procedural purposes” that preserved the ability of the 
court to “determine whether any further proceedings directed to the issue of relief, if any, may 
be maintained as a class action.” Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977).  
See also, e.g., Ridgeway v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 134, 74 F.R.D. 597, 603–04 
(N.D. Ill. 1977) (entering conditional order permitting a Title VII action to proceed as a class 
and explaining that arguments that “the class, as defined at this stage of the proceeding is over-
broad” are “untimely” because “the order issued today is conditional” and the court can “winnow 
out persons who don’t belong in the class at any later stage”). 
 16. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (pre-2003 version) with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) 
(post-2003 version). 
 17. See Committee Notes on Rule 23—2003 Amendment (describing the problems with 
premature rulings on class treatment and improper use of conditional certification under the 
earlier version of the rule). 
 18. See Committee Notes on Rule 23—2003 Amendment. 
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1998,19 but it begins to be used pervasively in the text only starting in the 2003 
amendments.20 In neither year did the Advisory Committee offer an 
explanation for this change in terminology, apparently considering it a 
semantic matter with little substantive significance.21 
As a consequence of these changes, Rule 23 now demands greater 
specificity in determining the status of absentees at the outset of a class 
proceeding. That requirement is also reflected in the stricter evidentiary 
standards that the Court has imposed through interpretation.22  This 
emphasis on specificity is appropriate, and it is consonant with the Court’s 
treatment of non-party preclusion in Taylor, where it made clear its preference 
for “crisp rules with sharp corners” that are predictable and will not produce 
inefficient satellite litigation.23  In Bayer, the Court reflected both these 
priorities when it voiced its concern that the federal district court that had 
denied the request for certification in that case had not devoted any explicit 
attention to the question whether its denial of certification would have the 
capacity to bind the absentees as a matter of issue preclusion.  In this respect, 
Bayer adopts a precautionary approach to binding absentees that is defensible. 
What is less defensible, however, is the suggestion in Bayer that the 
current version of Rule 23 would foreclose a district court from ever 
employing procedures designed to give a denial of certification binding 
effect.  That view reflects an assumption that the “certification” order under 
Rule 23 is an all-or-nothing proposition that either authorizes the initiation 
of a class action making absentees full “parties” to the action or else leaves 
them strangers to the action altogether.  Such a rigid approach is at odds with 
the provenance and history of Rule 23, which originally spoke in more open-
ended terms about the propriety of the case “proceeding as a class” and added 
the language of “certification” with no apparent intention to impose new and 
sharply defined formal consequences.  It also risks investing the language of 
Rule 23 with the power to dictate the bounds of preclusion doctrine, which a 
federal rule cannot do.24  To be sure, much early practice under Rule 23 
 19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (authorizing a court of appeals to “permit an appeal from an 
order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule”) (added in 1998). 
 20. The 2003 version of Rule 23 uses the term “certify” throughout.  Rule 23(c), previously 
titled “Determination by Order Whether Class Action To Be Maintained,” is restyled as 
“Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class Action.” Compare Rule 23(c) (pre-2003 
version) with Rule 23(c) (2003 version).  The 2003 version of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) makes reference 
for the first time to a requirement that the court “determine whether to certify the action,” and 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B) describes “[a]n order certifying a class action” when specifying what the order 
must contain. See also id. §§ (c)(2)(A) & (B), (e)(1)(A), (e)(3), (g)(1)(A). 
 21. See Committee Notes on Rules—1998 Amendment; Committee Notes on Rule 23 —
2003 Amendment. 
 22. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011). 
 23. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008). (citation omitted). 
 24. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (“[A] rule 
governing the effect that must be accorded federal judgments by other courts . . . would arguably 
violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules ‘shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right,’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). 
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suffered from a seat-of-the-pants approach that has properly been constrained 
by subsequent amendments on such matters as notice, settlement, and the 
obligations of class counsel.25  But if a district court were to apply the kind of 
attention to the capacity of a negative certification ruling to bind absentees 
that was missing in Bayer, expressly considering the representative nature of a 
decision not to certify a particular proposed class and ensuring adequate 
representation by putative class counsel on the question—and perhaps 
invoking Rule 23(c)(4) as a textual basis for applying that limited ruling to 
the putative absentees—then the concerns that the Court articulates in Bayer 
and Taylor could be satisfied.  There is no reason to read the references in 
Rule 23 to a “certification” order as a textual barrier foreclosing that result. 
Redish and Kiernan propose to dispense with such technicalities 
altogether.  In their place, they would simply invoke an estoppel directly 
against the plaintiff’s attorneys in a putative class action.  Emphasizing the 
undeniable fact that class counsel exercise de facto control over the lawsuit and 
typically have a much greater stake in the proceeding than any individual class 
member, Redish and Kiernan insist that it “makes no sense to confine res 
judicata’s reach solely to those formal litigants.”  Instead, they urge that we 
“redefine the real party in interest in the class action context” to encompass 
the attorney in the initial action as well as the named plaintiffs.26  As the 
authors acknowledge, their proposed solution would not have done any good 
in Bayer v. Smith itself, where the attorneys in the two class actions were not 
the same. But they forge ahead, emphasizing the role of class counsel as a 
guardian of a public trust27 and insisting that we overlook “formalistic” 
objections and “[v]iew[] class attorneys as pragmatic real parties in interest . . . 
for purposes of res judicata.”28 
There are many problems here. First, one is left to wonder why it makes 
sense to entertain this radical departure from traditional preclusion doctrine 
but not to implement the more modest alterations to that doctrine that would 
be necessary to bind absentees directly to a negative certification 
determination.  If one is upending settled doctrine, why not do so in a manner 
that is directly responsive to the problem, rather than proposing a solution 
that would not even have worked in the recent Supreme Court precedent that 
motivates the whole inquiry?  Redish and Kiernan anticipate the formal 
objections to their proposal—lawyers are not parties—by insisting on “the 
multi-party joinders rules’ modern focus on considerations of practicality.”29  
 25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (detailing notice requirements); 23(e) (setting forth 
requirements for settlement or compromise of the action); 23(g)–(h) (obligations of class 
counsel and standards for compensation). 
 26. Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at 1670. 
 27. Id. at 1674–75. The idea that class counsel undertake a public trust when they seek to 
represent absentees is one that I have emphasized in my own work when examining the 
prerogatives of class counsel. See Wolff, supra note 14, at 1925–26. 
 28. Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at 1676. 
 29. Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at 1676.  
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Of course, joinder policy is not the same thing as preclusion policy, and even 
the authors’ assertion about joinder policy is supported in a less than 
convincing manner.30  But even taking practicality as the preferred emphasis, 
why not apply that practical approach to a modest extension of the well-
established capacity of courts to bind absentees in properly entertained 
representative proceedings?  The authors’ response is to invoke the Due 
Process Clause in a manner that is highly formalistic (hence at odds with their 
exhortation for practicality) and erroneous (hence beside the point).  I will 
address these problems in the next section of this Essay.  For now, suffice it to 
say that principles of due process do not justify the authors’ choice to shift the 
focus of their preclusion analysis away from the absent class members and 
onto the plaintiff’s lawyers. 
As a matter of pure doctrine, moreover, the authors’ proposal raises far 
too many questions.  Is this treatment of lawyers as “real parties in interest” 
limited exclusively to the class action context?  Redish and Kiernan suggest as 
much with their extended discussion of the singular nature of class litigation.  
But if the authors believe class litigation to be so singular in nature as to 
warrant abandoning formal limitations on preclusion that have previously 
been held inviolate, then why do so with an indirect doctrine of limited 
effectiveness rather than addressing directly the problem of binding 
absentees?  If, instead, the authors seek to ground their proposal in a more 
general set of principles, then what limitations will this new doctrine observe?  
Any contingency-fee lawyer has a substantial personal stake in the outcome of 
a client’s case, and civil rights lawyers representing clients under fee-shifting 
statutes often have a larger amount at stake than the maximum extent of a 
client’s potential recovery in damages.  Despite the authors’ romantic view of 
the “attorney and client [who] often develop a bond through one-on-one 
interaction,”31 the experience of attorneys who process an inventory of claims 
in non-class mass adjudication is often far different, with lawyers offering a 
claims administration service aimed at group settlement with little personal 
interaction with their clients.32 One could ask similar questions about lawyers 
who specialize in qui tam actions, or requests under the Freedom of 
Information Act—the statute that provoked an unsuccessful attempt to 
expand the doctrine of virtual representation in Taylor v. Sturgell—because of 
the shared public nature of the rights being litigated.  Would all of these cases 
be candidates for a new doctrine of lawyer preclusion under the Redish and 
Kiernan proposal? 
 30. The only authority that Redish and Kiernan invoke for this “practical” approach to 
joinder policy is the phrase “as a practical matter” in the portions of Rule 24(a) and Rule 19(a) 
that are concerned with impacts on the interests of unrepresented persons.  See id. 
 31. Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at 1673. 
 32. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of 
Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 585 (2006) (documenting the 
increasing incidence of individual plaintiffs being represented on a mass inventory basis by 
attorneys seeking group settlements). 
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And what other preclusive consequences would attach to class counsel if 
the authors’ proposal were adopted?  Redish and Kiernan concern themselves 
solely with the phenomenon of serial attempts at certification.  Would class 
counsel be subject to issue preclusion on merits questions if they 
unsuccessfully litigated a claim on behalf of one class of claimants and then 
sought to prosecute a claim with overlapping issues on behalf of a different 
class?  If we are to treat class counsel as the “real party in interest” for 
preclusion purposes, this result would seem to follow. 
The “crisp rules with sharp corners” that the Court demanded for non-
party preclusion in Taylor v. Sturgell are absent under the authors’ proposal, 
unless one limits their novel doctrine of lawyer preclusion to the singular case 
of serial attempts at class certification.  If one does that, then the entire 
exercise is not worth the candle.  Redish and Kiernan have not offered a 
general approach to non-party preclusion.  They have isolated the problem of 
serial attempts at certification and gerrymandered a one-off solution around 
the asserted need to avoid any approach that involves binding absentees 
directly. That asserted need is based on a serious mischaracterization of the 
Court’s due process precedents in the field of representative litigation, the 
issue to which this Essay now turns. 
II. DUE PROCESS AND MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS AT CERTIFICATION 
Throughout their Article, Redish and Kiernan justify their proposal to 
extend preclusion doctrine to attorneys as a necessary expression of the 
“foundational due process dictate that litigants have a constitutional right to 
their day in court.”33  This dictate, they say, serves both to authorize their 
proposed solution and to foreclose all other alternatives.  Indeed, the authors 
claim great virtue for themselves in their adherence to this foundational 
dictate, seemingly casting themselves as Odysseus bound to the mast of due 
process, whose commands they are “not willing to ignore” despite the siren 
call of more expedient solutions that have tempted courts and scholars before 
them.34 
This is a strange way to talk about a problem relating to class action 
litigation.  The defining feature of the class action is the adjudication of claims 
on behalf of absentees who never have their day in court and who often have 
little meaningful opportunity to make an informed choice about whether to 
be bound by the proceedings.  The day in court paradigm in due process 
analysis is of great importance in individual litigation, both as a source of 
practical protection against inaccurate or exploitative results and as an 
expression of respect for the dignity of persons when the law is applied on an 
 33. Id. at 1663. 
 34. Id. 
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individualized basis.35  In class action litigation, in contrast, the entire 
doctrinal edifice is geared toward defining the conditions under which the 
interests of a claimant can be compromised despite the absence of 
individualized participation.  An absentee has not had his “day in court” when 
he receives a notice in the mail and either declines or fails to execute an opt-
out form.  And, of course, Rule 23 authorizes some injunctive or equitable 
class proceedings without any requirement for individualized notice or the 
chance to opt out—actions in which the individual day in court does not even 
have the theoretical substitute of consent, however much a formality that 
substitute may often be.36 
The major due process precedents that address the permissible bounds 
of class actions and similar representative proceedings—Hansberry v. 
Lee,37 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,38 and Philips Petroleum v. 
Shutts39—are all concerned with describing the conditions necessary for a 
representative action to affect the property rights of persons without an 
individual day in court or, in some cases, even without individualized notice. 
There is, quite simply, no absolute and unyielding foundational principle of 
the individual day in court in the context of representative litigation.  To posit 
such a principle is to disavow the controlling precedents and to propose that 
the modern class action should be subject to dramatic new constitutional 
constraints. 
It should be noted that Professor Redish has staked out a position along 
these lines in his book Wholesale Justice, questioning the viability of much of 
the modern class action enterprise in light of its impact on the “meta-
autonomy” of individuals in “making most choices about the nature of their 
participation in the [democratic] process.”40 Redish and Kiernan cite 
Wholesale Justice in their first sentence for its analogy of the class action to fire—
Prometheus, rather than Odysseus—and they cite it again in discussing the 
potential for class actions to benefit only the attorneys and not the class 
members in some instances.41  It is unclear whether the authors mean to 
 35. The idea of due process as a recognition of the individual regard to which litigants are 
entitled as a matter of dignity is one that Professor Mashaw has developed.  See generally JERRY L. 
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) & (b)(2). 
 37. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (imposing a constitutional requirement 
of adequate representation of the interests of absentees for any class action). 
 38. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–18 (1950) (setting forth 
due process standards for notice and describing the conditions under which a representative 
action may proceed in the absence of individual service of process to people whose legal interests 
will be affected). 
 39. Philips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (holding that state courts 
must establish personal jurisdiction over absent class members in a damages action through 
consent via notice and the opportunity to opt out if they would not otherwise have sufficient 
minimum contacts to adjudicate their claims). 
 40. MARTIN REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 4 (2009). 
 41. See Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at n.1, n.86 & accompanying text. 
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situate their Article as a corollary to Wholesale Justice and, hence, dependent 
on its assertions.  If so, their proposal can make a claim to consistency, albeit 
at the cost of limited practical significance, as they are proposing a solution 
to a class certification problem that they believe should frequently not be 
capable of existing in the first place.  If not, then the Article fails to make any 
case for ignoring the relevant due process precedents, merely asserting rather 
than justifying the seemingly misplaced “individual day in court” principle as 
a paradigm for due process analysis in representative litigation. 
The authors also make the unfortunate error of describing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer as a “due process” holding, or as expressing 
“due process” principles, in arguing that a denial of certification can never 
bind absentees, hence justifying—nay, demanding—their radical new 
approach.42  The Bayer Court, however, rested its holding on the common law 
of preclusion and the constraints of the federal Anti-Injunction Act.43  It 
expressly disavowed any due process component to its holding: “Because we 
rest our decision on the Anti-Injunction Act and the principles of issue 
preclusion that inform it, we do not consider Smith’s argument, based on 
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts. . . . that the District Court’s action violated the Due 
Process Clause.”44 And, citing this same language, the Court went out of its 
way to suggest that Congress and the rule makers still retain the authority to 
craft a solution to the multiple certification problem that would bind 
absentees directly: 
[N]othing in our holding today forecloses legislation to modify 
established principles of preclusion should Congress decide that 
[the Class Action Fairness Act] does not sufficiently prevent 
relitigation of class certification motions.  Nor does this opinion at 
all address the permissibility of a change in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure pertaining to this question.45 
Redish and Kiernan are free to excoriate the Bayer Court for failing to 
adopt their approach to due process, or for inviting further reforms that their 
constraining view of the Constitution would forbid. Advancing a misleading 
account of the holding that the Court actually issued, however, is another 
matter. 
My own position on the due process question has not changed since I 
first explored the issue six years ago.  As I explained then, “the Mullane/Shutts 
analytical methodology” requires that we analyze “the nature and extent of 
the change in the legal position of class members that is effectuated when a 
court issues a preemptive injunction to enforce its own denial of 
 42. Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at 1661–62; 1666–67. 
 43. Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376–79 (2011) (discussing the Anti-Injunction Act); 
id. at 2379–82 (discussing issue preclusion doctrine). 
 44. Id. at 2376 n.7  
 45. Id. at 2382 n.12. 
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certification.”46 If such an injunction “entails [only] the removal of a single 
remedial option from the litigation arsenal of an absentee” but otherwise 
“leaves the absentees’ legal claims uncompromised” and permits “meaningful 
alternative avenues for relief,”47 then the injunction effectuates a “limited and 
attenuated alteration in the legal position of class members . . . in the sense 
that it involves an aspect of the administration of their claims as to which they 
had no prelitigation expectation or reliance interest.”48 For reasons that I 
spell out at length in my earlier Article, the issuance of such an injunction 
would pose no due process concerns under Mullane and Shutts, despite the 
lack of individualized process to all class members at the certification stage, 
provided that the initial court focused explicit attention on the possibility that 
a denial of certification might bind the absentees and ensured that the 
proponents of the class provided adequate representation on that question.49 
The passages from Smith v. Bayer that are quoted above invite 
policymakers to craft a solution to the multiple certification problem that 
would bind absentees directly, with the implicit suggestion that due process 
can accommodate such a solution.  I believe that the analytical framework set 
forth in my earlier treatment of the issue still provides the best justification 
for that proposition, subject to the constraints that framework implies.  To be 
sure, there is room for disagreement on the issue.  But there is no room to 
argue that Smith v. Bayer embodies a radically new due process holding that 
requires the abandonment of any solution involving absent class members 
because of the entitlement of those absentees to their day in court.  Redish 
and Kiernan go seriously astray when they frame their proposal in these terms. 
III. LITIGATION DYNAMICS AND SERIAL CERTIFICATION 
Finally, there remains the question of the actual impact that the Redish 
and Kiernan proposal would be likely to have in light of the realities of 
complex litigation practice.  Several facts about modern complex litigation 
suggest that this proposal would miss the mark even if it were sustainable as a 
matter of theory and doctrine. 
The first relates to the salience of this, or any, proposed solution to the 
serial certification phenomenon.  With the enactment of CAFA, the 
availability of coordination through the MDL process, and the Court’s recent 
decisions constraining the scope of general “doing business” jurisdiction,50 it 
is unclear how often the serial certification problem will arise going forward.  
 46. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide 
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2101 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 2102. 
 48. Id. at 2105–06. 
 49. See id. at 2073–2109. 
 50. See Daimler AG v. Baumann, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014) (reaffirming that general 
“doing business” jurisdiction is only available where a corporation is genuinely “at home” and 
emphasizing that it will be the “exceptional” case where such jurisdiction exists beyond the 
corporation’s principal place of business and the states where it is incorporated). 
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In order for a case to pose a serious threat of abusive attempts at serial 
certification, it must be worth enough money to merit the kind of time and 
resources that would be involved in making such attempts.  It must also be 
amenable to the kind of forum shopping that would give serial attempts at 
certification a prospect for success, which would typically entail a defendant 
with a significant multi-state presence and, quite possibly, a class that 
encompasses residents of multiple states.  Most cases of this description can 
now be removed to federal court under CAFA, meaning that serial attempts 
at certification will either be coordinated before a single judge through the 
MDL process or else subject to the principles of comity among federal courts 
mentioned in Bayer that would make it unlikely for a lawyer who is 
conspicuously shopping for a better result to meet with a sympathetic 
response.51 In cases not subject to removal—which, by definition, are likely to 
be more localized disputes—the constraints on general jurisdiction will lessen 
the ability of class counsel to choose a new and more pliable forum when 
making multiple attempts at certification. If a lawyer is limited to a given state 
court system when using this tactic, there is every reason to expect that state 
judges would have reactions similar to those that the Bayer Court anticipates 
within the federal system, affording comity to the decisions of their colleagues 
on related cases and reacting with disfavor to conspicuous forms of strategic 
behavior. Finally, even when a given class action is not subject to removal to 
federal court, a recent survey by the Federal Judicial Center suggests that 
federal MDL judges coordinate with state courts in a significant number of 
complex matters when the latter entertain related or parallel proceedings.52 
These facts diminish the potential significance of the serial certification 
problem across the board; they are not specific to the Redish and Kiernan 
proposal. Still, the diminishing practical significance of the problem calls into 
question the wisdom of floating a solution that would breach a formal barrier 
between the status of parties and attorneys—a distinction that has heretofore 
been treated as largely inviolate in preclusion doctrine.53  The authors have 
 51. Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011) (“[W]e would expect federal courts to 
apply principles of comity to each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common 
dispute.”); see also Wolff, supra note 14, at 1945 & nn.244–46 (discussing this passage). 
 52. See EMERY G. LEE III, SURVEY OF FEDERAL TRANSFEREE JUDGES IN MDL PROCEEDINGS 
REGARDING COORDINATION WITH PARALLEL STATE PROCEEDINGS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL PANEL 
ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE 
JURISDICTION (2011) (finding that 43% of MDL judges surveyed had become aware of parallel 
state proceedings and that 60% of those judges had communicated in some fashion with their 
state counterparts to coordinate or share information). 
 53. In Taylor itself, for example, the two successive litigants who attempted to use the 
Freedom of Information Act to force the disclosure of airplane specifications had employed the 
same attorney. The lower federal courts invested that fact with great significance in finding that 
it was appropriate to bind the second litigant to the first judgment through a doctrine of virtual 
representation. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 890–91 (2008). The Court rejected that 
approach, finding instead that non-party preclusion would only be appropriate if the second 
litigant was engaged  in “a collusive attempt to relitigate [the first] action,” id. at 905–07, and it 
remanded for a factual determination on that question. 
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not made a serious case for such a tectonic shift, suggesting once again that 
they intend to present only a gerrymandered one-off solution. 
There is also a practical problem with the Redish and Kiernan proposal 
that the authors never deal with in a serious fashion.  Even if one accepts their 
extension of preclusion doctrine to class counsel, their proposal would only 
apply to cases in which the same lawyers make serial attempts at certifying the 
same class.  What does “the same lawyers” mean in this context? In cases that 
might present a significant danger of serial certification abuse—those with a 
substantial amount at stake and significant multi-state contacts—the norm is 
for multiple competing attorneys to jockey for position and influence.54  In 
the multi-district litigation process, judges appoint lead counsel to manage 
and control the herd of attorneys that are brought together by that powerful 
consolidation device,55 and Rule 23 itself contains a structure for selecting 
class counsel from among the competing lawyers who will often be involved 
in a given proceeding, even when the MDL process is not involved.56 Complex 
cases frequently involve multiple lawyers and firms, sometimes cooperating 
with each other and coordinating their actions, and sometimes competing for 
influence, compensation, and control.  In these paradigm cases, would Redish 
and Kiernan extend preclusion for a denial of certification only to the lawyers 
formally designated as lead or liaison counsel?  How would that way of 
proceeding affect the incentives of these lawyers in their representation of the 
class and their dealings with their colleagues?  Or would Redish and Kiernan 
extend preclusion to all the lawyers involved in an initial proceeding, 
regardless of the level of authority that they are able to exercise?  Such a 
profligate doctrine would seem to violate the careful statements about non-
party preclusion based on control or litigation-by-proxy that the Court 
delineated in Taylor v. Sturgell, particularly in the MDL process, where lawyers 
not included in the management committee may have little or no capacity to 
shape the proceedings. 
And all of these scenarios would produce predictable strategic responses 
from plaintiff’s attorneys.  If only lead or liaison counsel would be bound 
under the Redish and Kiernan doctrine, then one can predict that there 
would be side deals ensuring that lead counsel would still receive 
 54. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Keynote, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions 
and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 322–23 (2011) (describing 
dynamics of competition among firms in class action litigation and the potential for third-party 
financing to increase that competition); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass 
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1369–73 (1995) (describing the capacity for 
competition among multiple firms to develop into a “reverse auctions” in which “defendants can 
seek the lowest bidder from among these rival groups and negotiate with each simultaneously”).  
 55. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (describing the “hierarchies of influence” that MDL judges create to manage 
their dealings with large numbers of lawyers). 
 56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g); id. § (g)(2) (“If more than one adequate applicant seeks 
appointment [as class counsel], the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the 
interests of the class.”). 
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compensation if other lawyers had to take the lead in any subsequent attempts 
at certification.  If all affiliated lawyers would be swept into this expansion of 
preclusion doctrine, then plaintiff’s lawyers might make arrangements to 
keep some cooperating attorneys formally unaffiliated with the initial 
proceeding, ready to join the suit if the court grants class certification but 
available to file a separate proceeding as “new” lawyers if the first court denies 
the certification request.  Do Redish and Kiernan propose satellite 
proceedings with invasive discovery and the potential for intrusion into 
attorney-client communications and joint-representation agreements in order 
to determine the exact nature of the relationships among the lawyers and 
hence the potential applicability of preclusion?  The whole thing would be a 
mess. 
It is also presumably the case that the Redish and Kiernan proposal would 
be constrained by the strict requirements of issue preclusion: the “black-letter 
judgments law” that they insist on when critiquing pre-Bayer attempts to bind 
absentees.57  This would mean that an attorney, like an absent class member, 
could not be precluded or enjoined from making serial attempts at 
certification when the subsequent action is filed in a jurisdiction with 
materially different certification standards. In order to achieve a more robust 
outcome in the face of these strategic responses, it would be necessary for any 
initial ruling on certification to have a stronger preemptive effect.  The Bayer 
decision forecloses any argument that the Class Action Fairness Act can 
impose such preemption of its own force, and the authors propose no 
alternative. 
Finally, even in the absence of coordination, hidden side-deals, or other 
complicated multiple-lawyer scenarios, a fatal problem remains. If one lawyer 
tries and fails to secure class certification in a potentially valuable case, what 
reason is there to believe that another lawyer will not independently file a 
separate action and try again on her own?  If it makes financial sense for one 
lawyer to risk successive attempts at certification after an initial failure, it 
would often make sense for an unrelated lawyer to make the attempt when 
the first lawyer was precluded from doing so.  Perhaps Redish and Kiernan 
imagine that class action lawyers will generally be unaware of the actions filed 
by other lawyers who practice in their field.  But they provide no basis for 
believing that to be so. 
CONCLUSION 
The dynamics of high-stakes complex litigation are changing. The Class 
Action Fairness Act and the MDL process have federalized and consolidated 
many mass disputes that used to be dispersed among different courts.  Within 
the federal system, the Supreme Court has imposed increasing constraints.  
Following the Court’s decisions in Amchem and Ortiz, Rule 23 is largely 
 57. Redish & Kiernan, supra note 2, at 1679. 
 
2014] MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS AT CLASS CERTIFICATION 151 
unavailable for the resolution of mass personal injury disputes,58 and much of 
the activity around these claims has shifted to large-scale processing on an 
inventory basis.59  The Court’s massive expansion of the Federal Arbitration 
Act60 has called into question the enforceability of consumer protection and 
employment laws on an aggregate basis.61  And the Court has moved toward 
a ratcheting up of the commonality standard, a development that could 
constrain the availability of broadly framed class actions in all areas of 
substantive law if it continues.62  In this shifting terrain, any treatment of class 
action doctrine must combine analytical rigor with an informed 
understanding of the on-the-ground dynamics of litigation practice. 
It remains to be seen whether the phenomenon of serial attempts at class 
certification will constitute a problem of any great practical significance as the 
activities of plaintiff’s attorneys find a new center of gravity.  If so, there is 
ample room under the Due Process Clause to address that problem, even if 
the Court’s ruling in Bayer v. Smith will make lower courts cautious about 
implementing the necessary modifications to preclusion doctrine without 
further direction from Congress or the rule makers.  Distorting preclusion 
doctrine to permit a direct estoppel against class counsel, however, is not the 
answer.  Redish and Kiernan’s proposal seeks to justify a qualitative shift in 
the definition of preclusion by insisting on an idiosyncratic and inapt 
approach to due process in representative litigation that is based on an 
erroneous description of the controlling precedents. The proposal they 
advance is impractical, would be ineffective on its own terms, and would either 
impose systemic costs by destabilizing preclusion law in many other areas or 
else operate solely as a one-off proposition that lacks any broader theoretical 
coherence. 
The serial certification problem remains an engaging analytical puzzle.  
This wholesale redefinition of preclusion doctrine is not the solution. 
 58. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 592, 617–19 (1997) (enforcing strict 
adequacy of representation standard in asbestos personal injury class action and demanding 
undiminished adherence to Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirements even in a proposed 
settlement-only proceedings); Oritz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 844 (1999) (disallowing 
attempted use of Rule 23(b)(1)(b) as ersatz bankruptcy substitute for resolving mass asbestos 
claims). 
 59. See Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2012) 
(“Mass tort class actions have virtually disappeared as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
in Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., replaced by aggregated lawsuits 
resolved in multidistrict litigation (MDL).”). 
 60. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012). 
 61. See Am. Express v. It. Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (enforcing arbitration 
clause that effectively prevented merchants from pooling their efforts to assert viable antitrust 
claim); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (enforcing arbitration 
clause that prohibits consumers from pursuing classwide arbitration). 
 62. See Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011); but see Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1033–47 
(2013) (arguing that the commonality ruling in Dukes is best understood as a statement of Title 
VII policy rather than a broader revision of the commonality standard). 
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